In the first part of this white paper we review the history of research on evacuation decision making. A wide range of factors has been found that affect people's evacuation decisions after they hear hurricane forecasts and other information. Risk judgments are a major part of the decision, and hurricane risk perceptions have been studied from many different perspectives. This section ends with two summary diagrams illustrating how the different factors relate to each other.
INTRODUCTION
In the first part of this white paper we review the history of research on evacuation decision making. A wide range of factors has been found that affect people's evacuation decisions after they hear hurricane forecasts and other information. Risk judgments are a major part of the decision, and hurricane risk perceptions have been studied from many different perspectives. This section ends with two summary diagrams illustrating how the different factors relate to each other.
In the second part we turn to work testing models that predict evacuation rates for actual hurricanes in addition to measuring the relative importance of decision factors. We discuss examples of multiple regression and ethnographic decision modeling.
The last part of the paper includes suggestions for the workshop about future research that would draw on the strengths of the earlier work reviewed while dealing more directly with risk and the information in and timing of hurricane forecasts.
WHO EVACUATES AND WHY: AN OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH ON HURRICANE EVACUATION
Understanding who evacuates and who does not has been one of the cornerstones of research on the pre-impact phase of both natural and technological hazards. Its history is rich in descriptive illustrations that concentrate on lists of characteristics of those who flee to safety and those who do not. These characteristics often focused on warning message characteristics such as how many times a warning was heard; thus implying that the more often warnings were heard, the more likely that they would be believed. These early attempts at understanding evacuation focused almost singularly on warning as the key to understanding evacuation.
If warnings were heard and ultimately believed, evacuation would be the end result. Research has not generally considered how people came to believe these warnings and even how they interpreted the warning itself. In fact, the individual has seemed almost removed from the picture with analysis focusing exclusively on external, almost objective, measures. As can be imagined, this approach had a limited utility in understanding evacuation, and as a result, more sociological models of evacuation were developed that attempted to focus more on evacuation and warning as social processes.
The problem, however, remained that even these more process-oriented models failed to look at the evacuation issue from a broad perspective. Models still tended to take an either-or approach, focusing almost exclusively on socioeconomic indicators or on risk or on warning messages. Few, if any, attempted to integrate a broad range of factors that modeled the evacuation decisionmaking process. Instead, the focus seemed to be on maximizing the predictability of models regardless of how decisions are made. This type of modeling resulted in contradictory models where one researcher found a variable significant and another found the variable not significant. Consequently, evacuation research still failed to inform the dialogue on how to motivate evacuation for those that need to flee to safety, while at the same time constraining those that should stay in place.
The underlying issue is that evacuation decision making, and perhaps hazard decisions in general, are complex processes that are not easy to categorize. Little research has focused on how individuals use information to assess their risk and consequently decide to take or not to take protective measures. What complicates understanding the decision-making process is the fact that the setting itself is often uncertain when making hazard decisions in general, and always uncertain when making hurricane decisions. As a result, decision makers have a difficult time grasping and understanding not only the probability of the event, but also the range of options available to them. Although emergency managers and others assume that people will act rationally-hear a warning, realize danger based on the warning, and leave when told to do so (because the cost of staying outweighs the benefit)-more often than not, many of those at greatest risk choose not to take protective measures each time a warning is given.
As we see time and time again, our understanding of evacuation is extremely limited. Those expected to evacuate often do not, and those who should not evacuate (at least in the estimation of emergency managers) often do. And although modern-day hurricanes cause significantly more damage than deaths, at some point our inability to understand the evacuation phenomena will leave thousands on highways trying to flee and tens of thousands in their homes in low-lying locations vulnerable to storm surge.
Many approaches have been used to attempt to understand evacuation. >From descriptive models focusing almost exclusively on warning characteristics (Williams, n.d.) , to more sociological models focused on warning as a process (Mileti, Drabek, and Hass 1975; Mileti and O'Brien 1992; Nigg 1993) , evacuation research has had a long evolving history. One of the most important shifts in evacuation research has been the move away from trying to understand evacuation simply as a function of warning by recognizing that evacuation is also a function of various social, environmental and social psychological characteristics (Mileti, Drabek, and Hass 1975; Turner 1979; Perry and Greene 1982) .
One of the key factors in understanding the evacuation decision-making process is risk perception. Knowledge about hazards alone is not enough to motivate action. Instead, information must be translated into a notion of pending danger. Although risk can be seen as a technical notion calculated based on the probability of events and the magnitude of specific consequences (Kasperson et al. 1988) , others define it based on its social meaning, characterized by worry, dread, angst, concern, or anxiety (Rogers 1982; Jaeger et al. 2001) . Others see risk as a more sociological concept that takes into account context and culture in the interpretation of what is dangerous (Turner 1979; Tierney 1994; White 1994) .
In his 1987 article, "Perception of Risk," Paul Slovic asserts that "whereas technologically sophisticated analysts employ risk assessment to evaluate hazards, the majority of citizens rely on intuitive risk judgments, typically called 'risk perceptions'" (Slovic 1987, p. 280) . Individuals employ mental strategies in their attempt to understand an uncertain world. Slovic (1987, p. 281) argues that difficulties in understanding probabilistic processes, biased media coverage, misleading personal experiences, and the anxieties generated by life's gambles cause uncertainty to be denied, risks to be misjudged, and judgments of fact to be held with unwarranted confidence.
What we can conclude is that models of individualized risk perception cannot be grand models; instead, they must include social dimensions based on the decision maker's frames of reference. More sociological models of risk take context and culture into account. Decision making and risk assessment do not happen in isolation, but rather at the intersection of social processes. Individuals process information through their own social lenses constructed by their particular cultural context, and as a result, individuals may well interpret the same information and messages differently. Turner (1979) asserts that individuals often have problems assessing their own risk, and these risk perception problems derive from difficulties in obtaining and processing information. Understanding how people obtain and process information, then, is a vital part of understanding hurricane warning response.
Although risk perception is influenced by a wide array of factors, there is much that we do not know about risk, particularly from a sociological perspective. In fact, Tierney (1994, p. 5) argues that sociologists are increasingly arguing that existing research on risk can be criticized less for what it has found than for what it has failed to examine, and that sociology's contributions lie in focusing on what other disciplines take for granted, correcting existing biases, and filling in the gaps in our understanding of risks and risk analysis.
Tierney is most critical of the notion that there is some objective and knowable calculation that individuals can assess as it relates to risk. She refutes the idea that individuals know their level of objective risk. In other words, even when presented with information such as elevation of home or location near the coast, individuals may still interpret that information through their social lenses, and as a result, their risk determination is not objective.
Tierney takes a different approach by focusing on the idea that risk is socially constructed. "A social constructivist approach does not claim that there is no objective basis for believing that certain risks exist," (Tierney 1994, p. 6 ) but does not focus on these objective notions. Instead Tierney supports the notion that "the basic sociological task is to explain how social agents create and use boundaries to demarcate that which is dangerous" (Clarke and Short 1993, p. 379) . Social and cultural factors cannot be ignored when analyzing and understanding risk. Information is processed within social contexts that influence how individuals assess the level of danger. As "potential" threats become realized threats, and as abstract vague ideas of potential damage become real, levels of danger may increase. At this juncture, decision making often becomes more complicated as decisions are in part influenced by risk perception, which itself is influenced by official messages characterizing the threat as real.
Understanding how people transition from hearing evacuation orders to deciding to evacuate is an interesting undertaking and fuses together, at least in part, what is known about warning compliance and risk perception. The majority of research on evacuation has focused on either the characteristics of those who evacuate and those who do not (Baker 1979; Cross 1979; Baker 1991; Fischer et al. 1995; Dow and Cutter 1998; or difficulties associated with evacuation (Baker 1980; Mileti and Sorenson 1987) . Few, such as Perry, Lindell, and Greene (1981) and Gladwin and Peacock (1997) , have attempted to model evacuation compliance.
Recognizing that evacuation research needs to look more at the decision-making process, recent research that examined evacuation responses for hurricanes Fran and Bertha found that household evacuation decisions are being influenced more by media and other household characteristics than by actual warnings (Dow and Cutter 1998) , which emphasizes the need to broaden models beyond a singular focus on warning response. Over time, more complex models of evacuation compliance have been developed, with risk perception as the central focus and with more reliable indicators of evacuation behavior (Baker 1991; Perry 1994; Dow and Cutter 1998; Whitehead et al 2000) .
These different approaches to the evacuation issue look at the dynamics of evacuation decision making in new ways (see Gladwin, Gladwin, and Peacock 2001, discussed later) and attempt to close the gaps in our understanding of how possible bad experiences during one evacuation can affect future evacuation decisions (Dow and Cutter 1998; Dash and Morrow 2001) . Although popular belief would seem to indicate that bad evacuation experiences result in a lower likelihood of evacuation for future storms, Dow and Cutter (1998) investigated possible effects of the "Crying Wolf" syndrome (an evacuation order for a storm that misses). Their work examined evacuation behavior for two 1996 storms in South Carolina, Hurricane Bertha (which had minimal effects), and two months later, Hurricane Fran. Dow and Cutter (1998) found that "despite the difference in the storms, there was a considerable degree of consistency in individuals' decision to evacuate" (p. 245). They report that 39% of respondents evacuated for both storms, and another 37% remained in their homes for both storms. Only 3% evacuated for Hurricane Bertha but not for the subsequent Hurricane Fran.
Similarly, Dash and Morrow (2001) investigated the effect of evacuation return delays on future evacuation plans. The hypothesis was that those who evacuated and experienced lengthy delays at roadblocks would be less likely to evacuate for the next storm threat, but the results suggested that those who experienced the delays are less likely to be adversely affected than those who knew of the delays only through media reports. Similar to the conclusions drawn in the work by Dow and Cutter (1998) , Dash and Morrow conclude that risk perception has greater saliency in the decision-making process. Although models of evacuation have addressed the direct relationship between a host of factors and evacuation compliance, little has been done to develop comprehensive models of evacuation that focus on a breadth of decision-making factors.
What is called for, then, is new models that focus on the decision-making process, and not simply on evacuation outcomes. These new models must address three inter-related, major broad factors: individual-level indicators, event-oriented variables, and risk perception. Individual-level indicators are those characteristics of decision makers that influence the decisions they make. These measures are independent of hazard events and offer the context in which these decisions are made. They exist before any hazard messages are issued. Event factors, on the other hand, directly relate to the hazard. Risk is the assessment of how dangerous a hazardous event appears to be to the decision maker.
The goal is to develop a model that includes key components of decision-making processes. A key component to the model is risk perception, which is influenced by a host of factors that make it a very comprehensive measure. More important, however, is that risk becomes a product of not only the technical, but also the social. Renn et al. (1992, p. 139) argue that a "novel and integrative framework is necessary to analyze the social experience of risk and to study the dynamic processing of risks by the various participants in a pluralistic society." To do this, they argue that risk needs to be approached as both a social and technical concept through a "social amplification of risk" approach that tends to see risks from a broad perspective. Renn et al. (1992) 
define this approach as
The concept of social amplification of risk is based on the thesis that events pertaining to hazards interact with psychological, social, institutional, and cultural processes in ways that can heighten or attenuate individual and social perceptions of risk and shape risk behavior.
Even though risk perception is a major factor in evacuation-related decisions, it is not the only influence; likewise, focusing only on individual-level variables fails to capture complexities of the decision-making process. Approaching evacuation as a process and not simply as an outcome is key to understanding why some evacuate and some do not, and more important, determining what can be done to motivate more compliance.
To do this, a comprehensive model of evacuation that accounts not only for demographic variation (measured with socioeconomic indicators), but also for variables that are key to the decision-making process (such as hazard-specific factors including hazard knowledge) must be developed.. In addition, the model must include specific measures of risk perception. Some models may, for example, result in understanding large amounts of variation (Perry 1985) , but this does not help us understand the decision-making process itself.
Figure 1 outlines a basic model of evacuation that includes decision-making frames and factors. The model, however, although comprehensive in its included variables, does not address the complicated nature of how the factors influence each other. At this point, it is meant for illustrative purposes to highlight the types of factors that must be included. Figure 2 is a more comprehensive model that illustrates a variety of the complicated relationships among variables. In addition, it delineates some of the specific variables that should be included in evacuation models.
Figure 1. Basic model of evaluation

Figure 2. Comprehensive model of evaluation
Future research to understand the evacuation issue must move beyond understanding the characteristics of those who evacuate and those who do not. We must learn what factors people consider as they make their decisions. Today, many people hear that a storm is approaching the United States or the Caribbean, and on their own, they seek information from weather Web sites and determine their own risk. We know little about how this new information is used. Do individuals have the capacity to understand and process the information they use to make their evacuation decisions, and how does this information affect not only the decision to evacuate, but probably more importantly, their risk perception? Do people consider how safe their home is; what role, for example, does having shutters on their home influence risk perception and evacuation?
More then anything, however, we must move beyond seeing evacuation as a linear process. Even though much has been learned about evacuation over time, we still fail to understand how complicated individuals find the process of deciding to evacuate. There is no denying that some people are simply "evacuators," and little is needed to motivate them to take shelter when needed. As recent storms have shown, though, many still fail to recognize their danger. Until we have a better understanding of what influences people's risk perception and consequently their decision to evacuate, we will not be able to effectively retool messages or educational programs to foster increased risk awareness.
MODELS PREDICTING EVACUATION RATES AND DECISIONS
In this part, we present some examples of recent work on modeling evacuation decisions. The importance of these models is that they are steps in the direction of filling in the link between forecasts and the effects of evacuation rates such as clearance times, shelter usage, potential casualty rates, and other quantitative measures important to emergency managers and other officials.
Dependent Variable: Actual rather than Hypothetical Evacuation
It is important to note that hypothetical questions do not give good estimates of evacuation rates. Generally they result in estimates much higher than would be expected for an actual hurricane. With that said, however, hypothetical questions can show some interesting effects of hurricane experience. For example, the following hypothetical question was asked each year by Florida International University (FIU) researchers in a statewide poll of Florida residents (Heise, Gladwin, McLaughen 1992): In the future, if you had two days notice to prepare for a hurricane of the intensity of Hurricane Andrew, which of the following would you be most likely to do? Would you leave the area completely in order to get out of the path of the storm, would you go to a shelter, would you go to stay with family or friends in the area, or would you stay in your home during the storm? Figure 3 shows results from 1992 (asked shortly after Hurricane Andrew) through 1998 measuring the percentage of people who said they would not stay in their home. There is a strong "Andrew effect" leading to higher estimates in 1992 and then declining over the next 2 years. For this chart three groups of respondents are compared: people who do not live in areas that were affected by Andrew, people living in areas that experienced hurricane-force winds but were north of the eye wall, and those living in south Miami-Dade County where the Andrew eye and eye wall passed. For the latter two groups there is a clear experience effect that reduced evacuation rates. 
Regression Models
Figures 1 and 2 above outline models that combine a number of factors involved in predicting hurricane evacuation. Multiple regression provides a way to test these models, evaluate the relative importance of decision factors, and measure the extent to which these variables can predict actual evacuation behavior. In these studies the dependent variable is usually a 1/0 dummy variable: evacuate or do not evacuate. Logistic regression is the most commonly used method to model such data.
We present two examples of these regression models, one based on Hurricane Andrew evacuation data (Gladwin and Peacock 1997) , and the other based on data from Hurricane Georges (Dash 2002) .
In deciding on the variables to collect for the Hurricane Andrew study, the researchers were guided by the literature discussed previously. This resulted in the following list of hypotheses (Gladwin and Peacock 1997, pp. 65-66 , quoted by permission of the book editors/copyright holders).
Households in evacuation areas will evacuate if they are told by authorities to do so. This is the most obvious hypothesis and one on which most emergency management directors depend. Households simply do not have all of the necessary information on which to base an evacuation decision, yet they live in very vulnerable locations. They must depend on decisions made by authorities and the literature clearly suggests that they do. Our sample results substantiate this.
• People are more likely to evacuate if they hear the warning in person from a family member, friend, or authority figure rather than just from the media. Being told to evacuate in person greatly increases the chances a household will evacuate. We asked our respondents how they found out they were in an evacuation zone and should evacuate-specifically, if they heard it from a friend, neighbor, relative, or authority.
• The experience of part hurricanes tends to make people confident that they can weather hurricanes in their homes. It is often said that experience is the best teacher; i.e., get burned by touching a stove once and you will not do it again. Unfortunately, the hurricane "experience" varies greatly. Hurricanes rarely hit exactly the same place, and they vary in strength, intensity, rainfall, and speed. Nevertheless, experience tends to lessen the probability of evacuating because "hurricane sages" think that they could safely go through any hurricane if they have lived through one (Quarantelli 1980, p. 40) . Although some South Florida residents had experienced previous hurricanes, few had made evacuation decisions before or had experienced a Category 3+ hurricane. In our data we asked if anyone in the household had experienced a hurricane before and also how long the household had been located in South Florida.
• Families headed by aged persons, or extended family households containing aged persons, are less likely to evacuate in response to hazard warnings. There are a variety of reasons for this expectation (Perry 1979, p. 35) . First, as discussed above, older people are more likely to have experienced a hurricane and to believe they can survive in their own homes. Second, the difficulties associated with evacuation, particularly to shelters, are greater for older people.
As the young man quoted at the beginning of this chapter said, "My grandmother wanted to stay because she knew that it wouldn't be comfortable being with a lot of people." Third, older people in both urban and rural areas may be more isolated from information about the risks of staying. For our analysis we define an elderly household as one in which at least one person was at least 70 years old.
• Households with young children are more likely to evacuate. Furthermore, women are more likely to plan actively for evacuation while men are more likely to wait passively until ordered to do so. Households with young children can be assumed to be more likely to have the mother as a major decision maker, thus increasing the likelihood of evacuation. In our data, households with at least one child under 10 are designated as households with young children.
• Ethnic minorities are less likely to evacuate than Anglos. This finding is probably a result of economic conditions rather than race or ethnicity per se in that minorities may have fewer evacuation options. In our analysis, Black and Hispanic evacuation is compared to Anglo evacuation.
• People with higher incomes are more able to and thus more likely to evacuate. They are less constrained by transportation options (such as personal auto, plane, or taxi) and can afford to stay in hotels. To the extent that property security is an issue, higher income neighborhoods tend to be less open to looting and are more likely to have theft insurance; thus, there is less inhibition about leaving.
• People living in small households are more likely to be mobile and able to evacuate. One of the major findings of evacuation studies is that households tend to evacuate as a whole (Drabek 1983) . It follows that smaller households will be less constrained and will find the logistics of evacuation easier. Hence they could be expected to evacuate at higher levels.
• People living in multiunit buildings are more likely to evacuate than those living in singlefamily dwellings. Many multifamily units along the coast are required by management to be evacuated. Furthermore, residents of single-family dwellings, particularly owners, are more likely to be concerned about the security of their property and hence to stay to protect it.
• The ability of a household to evacuate will be contingent on preparation. Although we do not have a single evaluative measure on level of household preparation, we do have the time a household began to prepare. Given the relationship between evacuation and preparation time, it is possible that households that were well prepared needed only to start preparation time just before evacuating. However, we speculate that in general the later a household began to prepare, the less likely it was to evacuate because it was caught in a dilemma between evacuating versus preparation. Table 1 shows the results of one set of regression models (from Gladwin and Peacock 1997, p. 68). Overall, three types of variables stand out as unique and significant predictors of evacuation. First, being in an evacuation zone; second, having demographic factors associated with small households and the presence of either elders (a negative effect) or children (a positive effect); and third, living in a single-family dwelling. It is interesting to note that having children in the household and being located in an evacuation zone closely rival each other in their relative importance as predictors.
Of all the factors considered, the one most often mentioned, and the strongest predictor, is living within an evacuation zone. This factor in some sense captures risk, in that households located in evacuation zones are officially recognized as being in danger of damage and mortality. In light of the salience of this factor, it seems reasonable to suggest that the decision-making process itself, and hence the way factors influence evacuation, would be shaped by whether or not a household is located in an evacuation zone. When we tested how the factors influenced household evacuation depending on whether or not a household was located in an evacuation zone, we found very different processes at work (Table 2 , from Gladwin and Peacock 1997, p. 70) .
The two models in Table 2 predict household evacuation separately for those within and outside evacuation zones. Although there are similarities with respect to the factors previously found to be important, a number of differences also emerge. First, household size, the presence of an elder or children, and residing in a single-family dwelling remain strong predictors, regardless of a household's location. For households within evacuation zones, however, years in South Florida and income become significant factors as well. In particular, the longer a household has resided in South Florida, the lower its odds for evacuating. Upper income households were much more likely to evacuate. It is also interesting to note that Black households (of which majority are African American) that reside in evacuation zones were less likely to evacuate, with their odds being reduced by almost two-thirds compared to Anglos. In the case of both models, there is much left to account for when predicting evacuation; however, these findings clearly suggest that very different factors influenced the evacuation decisions made by South Floridians living in these two locations. Figure  2 . A number of logistic regression models were run on subgroups of variables and to test interaction effects. Pseudo R 2 measures indicated the amount of variance in the evacuation decision explained, from .335 (Cox) to .479 (Nagel). In the sections that follow, we list some of the variables that proved to be significant predictors of the evacuation decision.
Risk
This is an index created by adding responses on the following two questions: (1) "As it approached, how dangerous did Hurricane Georges seem to you then, in terms of death or serious injury? Would you say extremely dangerous, very dangerous, somewhat dangerous, or not dangerous?" and (2) "How concerned were you about damage or destruction to your home when George approached? Were you very concerned, somewhat concerned, only a little concerned, or not concerned?" The scale was positively related to increased likelihood of evacuation. Respondents who thought the hurricane was dangerous were also asked why they thought so. Results of this follow-up question were coded for storm direction, storm strength, and damage already done by Hurricane Georges in the Caribbean. Modeled by themselves all three predicted higher evacuation rates, although only the last appeared to be a unique predictor.
The following are some findings from the Dash (2002) analysis:
• Feel they should do what is best for them even if authorities say otherwise: "Yes" answer decreased likelihood of evacuation.
• Knew evacuation order had been given: Increased likelihood of evacuation.
• Household had evacuation plan before Georges: Increased likelihood of evacuation.
• Evacuated for Hurricane Andrew: Increased likelihood of evacuation.
• Miami-Dade resident who was living in the county north of Hurricane Andrew eye/eye wall impact area in 1992: Decreased evacuation.
• Family size: Larger family sizes decreased likelihood of evacuation.
• Young children in household: Increased likelihood of evacuation.
The question remains as to how these characteristics affect decision making. For example, do decision makers with large families think directly about the issue when deciding whether to evacuate or not? Or is it simply a lens through which information is filtered?
Ethnographic Decision Models
Logistic regression models of the evacuation decision typically capture at most about 30% to 50% of the variance in the decision. Some of the unexplained variance can undoubtedly be explained by idiosyncratic factors. Factors that are contingent on a particular circumstance of a household, however, may strongly affect the decision. Such dependencies can be modeled in regression through the use of interaction terms and dummy variables, but doing so requires guessing at the effects and then testing them in the model. These dependencies are not normally collected in evacuation surveys, whether quantitative or qualitative.
To deal with this situation Gladwin, Gladwin, and Peacock (2001) utilized hierarchical ethnographic decision modeling. This approach offers a systematic procedure whereby, through a set of iterative processes, a general decision model-to evacuate or not evacuate in the face of a hurricane threat-is inductively derived from specific individual reports about recent evacuation decisions. Data collection begins inductively rather than deductively. This method does not depend on conventional, rational choice theory assumptions of complete information and a unitary utility function for the household: individuals within the same household, acting in their own self-interest, are assumed to gather information about the hurricane and assess the danger to themselves, their families, their businesses, and their pets, but they may do it differently and reach different conclusions that then must reach convergence if the household is to stay or evacuate together.
For this study residents were interviewed who had been in South Florida during both hurricanes Andrew and Erin in 1994 and 1995 . From the personal reports of 60 key individual decision models were constructed. The interviews averaged about 1 hour each and were taped. Respondents were asked to mentally put themselves back into the situation in which they found themselves as the hurricane approached, establishing a general overall sequence of events as they remembered them. With the assistance of the interviewer, respondents were then re-guided through the various decision points that emerged from their stories. Many of these decision points were ones where the decision seemed automatic in that respondents could not remember making a decision (cf. Tversky 1972) . When questioned, however, people were able to recall things about the decision such as, "In those days when I heard the authorities put out an evacuation order, I just assumed I would leave. I didn't question it. Now I might do it differently." Based on these accounts as well as answers to the contrasting question, "Why did you decide to evacuate with Hurricane Andrew but not with Hurricane Erin?" flow charts were constructed to model the decision of each household. These were then analyzed and combined into a joint flow chart that modeled the decisions of all the households. This can be done for decision processes where inductive study reveals that most households face the same top-level information (e.g., information they get from television and other media sources about hurricane risk and evacuation orders) and constraints.
After the initial development of the model, it was pre-tested and revised further during 40 phone interviews with Miami-Dade County residents. Because the final goal was to test the resulting tree on a large random sample, in addition to revising the decision tree, part of the pre-testing stage consisted of developing an instrument in which every criterion in the decision tree was converted to a question in the questionnaire. The decision tree model along with the questionnaire was repeatedly revised until the decision was made to finish the inductive phase of the work.
Next was a deductive test of the resulting model of hurricane evacuation decision processes via phone interviews. In this step, different interviewers with a separate random sample of 954 South Florida residents, who mostly lived in evacuation zones in Miami-Dade County at the time of Hurricane Andrew. The model it was converted into a simple SPSS program that recorded the number of successes and failures in prediction on each path of the tree. The overall success of the decision tree was then determined by the percentage of individual decisions that were correctly predicted. Most of the decisions were correctly predicted (87%), although the results of this model with its many branches and degrees of freedom cannot be directly compared with regression R 2 s. Figure 4 shows the top-level decision tree for households that are not solely composed of elders. Note that some of the variables are the same as those incorporated in Dash's model discussed above (Dash 2002) . Because we were all part of the FIU disaster research team, we were able to incorporate findings from a study of one hurricane into survey questions about another.
Hexagonal boxes in Figure 4 indicate subroutines in the decision model that are not shown in Figure 1 . The important words in these boxes are "unless" and "evacuate now unless something else happens." The things that happen here are those that make people delay until it's too late, or evacuate and get caught in traffic jams. In the Hurricane Andrew model interviews, the event was in the past and the decisions had been made so a static model could be devised. A real-time evacuation decision model would have to handle these decision routines cyclically through the time preceding the hurricane impact. 
WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
As this review of research indicates, much progress has been made in understanding evacuation behavior. Different behavioral research disciplines have contributed in ways related to their theoretical orientations. Economists and psychologists coming from a rational-choice perspective have found systematic deviations from optimal behavior (Kunreuther and Linnerooth 1984; Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein 1984;  and others cited in the first part of this paper).
Psychologists and others using a social cognition framework have shown the importance of selfefficacy, particularly that which can be derived from a better understanding of forecast information (Burnett et al. 1997; Dow and Cutter 1998; Benight, Gruntfest and Sparks 2004) . Still other researchers study how information processing and verification constraints affect the timing of evacuation decisions Prater 2002, Lindell and Perry 2004) . Sociologists and anthropologists using multiple regression and ethnographic decision modeling have been more inductive and eclectic, opting to model any relevant variables that will make evacuation rates more predictable. We believe that all these approaches are valuable and have contributed to a better understanding of the evacuation process. What should come next in evacuation research?
Before giving our suggestions we should note that it would be a good idea to ask forecasters and emergency managers what they want evacuation research to do, which can be done at the workshop. At this point, however, we believe the following three objectives to be important:
First, more accurate and geographically focused prediction of evacuation rates is needed. This would give emergency managers a better idea of where evacuation orders would be followed and where they (and forecasters, the media, etc) should focus their efforts to improve communication of forecast information and risks people face if they do not evacuate. Furthermore better prediction of evacuation rates also enables better estimation of potential hurricane consequences that depend on evacuation rates, including clearance times, shelter usage, and potential casualty rates.
Second, we should look much more closely at the content and flow of information from forecasters to decision makers-decision makers being both officials who make evacuation calls and people who are supposed to evacuate when ordered. This is important because it tells forecasters and others down the information line how to best shape and communicate forecast messages. A good example is the current discussion of the "cone of probability" versus the forecast track. To decision makers forecast information feeds into subjective indicators of risk, and the process of assessing one's risk. For example, although we can argue that those in mobile homes are more vulnerable, some still believe that mobile homes are safe. We must first understand how people come to their risk conclusions, including how they interpret warning messages and assess the safety of their homes, before we can effectively suggest changes to the messages themselves.
Third, we must better incorporate time into evacuation modeling. In urban areas people often wind up deciding to evacuate too late, becoming caught in traffic jams that potentially expose them to greater risk than if they had stayed home. Or they may hear about the traffic and not evacuate when they should. With better temporal modeling we can more easily what will get people to evacuate in a timely manner. Evacuation behavior models can also be used as inputs to traffic-clearing models if they incorporate time in their predicions.
What new research emphases might be added to the kind of research already being done that would move more rapidly in the direction of meeting these three objectives?
One important task is to look more closely at what people are thinking and doing when they comprehend and act on forecast warning messages. Some research is exploring this in areas other than hurricane evacuation (Vàri 2003) , but it is needed here. How do people use warning information? How much do they simply take and accept what they hear, how much do they gather information and then interpret it for themselves, and how do they do the interpretation? These are questions about cognition and we believe that more cognitive research should be incorporated to understand evacuation thinking and decision making. People interpret warning messages in terms of their beliefs and knowledge. These are usually remembered as scenarios or stories (Schank and Abelson 1977) , often taking the form of causal relations-beliefs about likely consequences of events that get modified through experience (see Cameron 2003 on health risk perceptions). Other important cognitive work to incorporate is what is known as "socially distributed cognition." This work studies decisions made by groups of people with different areas of expertise and authority, often in situations where considerable risk is involved if decisions are not made correctly (Hutchins 1995) . In such circumstances correct information transmission is critical and relies on commonly understood measuring scales. This is difficult in situations such as hurricane warning where forecasters, emergency managers, and the public have very different levels of expertise and understanding of scales and diagrams representing hurricane risk. Although these factors have been covered in the literature reviewed in this paper, we feel that most of it has been anecdotal instead of a connected systematic analysis.
More research of this type will directly address the second objective in our previous list. It is also likely to provide a better rationale for selecting variables in building regression models and thus better predicting evacuation rates. As it relates to the third requirement, this research would furnish more detailed mechanisms for the operation of temporal decision models at the household level and at the large-scale information flow level (Lindell and Prater 2002) . It could also enable new types of evacuation decision simulations to be constructed in the same manner as expert system programs (Giarratano and Riley 1994) and model evacuation decisions over time as new information and constraints get applied to evacuation decision makers.
A focus on how people conceptualize hazard information and risk also gives wider scope to the understanding of ethnic and cultural differences in evacuation decision making (Douglas and Wildavsky 1983; Zhang, Prater and Lindell 2004 ) , as well as in modeling those differences (King et al. 2003) .
There is one difficulty with this suggestion of attending more closely to what people think when they make evacuation decisions, and we think it points to a weakness of most evacuation research. The difficulty arises from the fact that after a hurricane hits or misses and time goes by, people have trouble remembering exactly what happened hour by hour and what their different understandings were as they were making their decisions. Studies necessarily have to be done after the fact, and people often rationalize that they made the best decision, altering their memory in the process. We need people ready to go out and ask about decisions during an event or right afterward. An example of one real-time approach was a pilot study done by researchers at FIU's Institute for Public Opinion Research. Using a short questionnaire based on criteria obtained from previous FIU evacuation decision research, the pilot study investigators called people in South Florida who were under evacuation orders as Hurricane Francis approached. In one night,
